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SUMMARIES 
Peirce's publications on the method of scientific 
investigation (as distinct from his work in formal 
logic and mathematics) are his most important and val- 
uable contributions to philosophy. His views on this 
subject are superior in clarity and cogency to his 
voluminous writings on metaphysics and cosmology. He 
subscribed to a fallibilistic conception of knowledge 
that is poles apart from a wholesale skepticism; his 
formulations of the conditions for meaningful discourse 
and of the pragmatic maxim, though not free from diffi- 
culties, have been fruitful sources of much subsequent 
philosophical and scientific analyses; and his classi- 
fication of and discussions of types of argument or 
reasoning employed in scientific inquiry continue to 
be valuable and insightful clarifications of this im- 
portant subject. In contrast to his account of scien- 
tific method, Peirce's evolutionary theory of ultimate 
reality, though marked by originality and ingenious 
speculation, has little merit as a contribution to 
genuine knowledge. 
Les publications de Peirce sur la methode d'enquete 
scientifique (h distinguer de ses travaux en logique 
formelle et en mathhmatiques) reprgsentent sa plus 
importante et sa plus valable contribution 2 la 
philosophie. Ses vues sur ce sujet dgpasse en claret6 
et en profondeur ses volumineux Ccrits en mgtaphysique 
et en cosmologie. I1 Btait partisan d'une conception 
faillibilliste de la connaissance, aux antipodes d'un 
scepticisme g&&ali&; sa formulation du pr&cepte 
pragmatique et des conditions n&essaires h un discours 
significatif, quoique non exempte de difficult&, % 
6t.6 ult&ieurement une source abondante d'analyses 
philosophiques et scientifiques; sa classification et 
ses discussions des diffgrents types d'arguments et de 
raisonnements employ& en sciences demeurent valables 
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et nous &Claire& encore sur cet important sujet. En 
comparaison avec son approche de la m&hode scientifique, 
sa th&orie 6volutionniste de la r&alit& ultime, bien 
que pleine d'originalite et de sficulations ing&nieuses, 
a peu de m&rite en tant que contribution a une 
connaissance authentique. 
Als wichtigste und wertvollste Beitr;ige zur 
Philosophie (im Unterschied zu seinen Arbeiten in 
formaler Logik und Mathematik) werden die Veerbffent- 
lichungen von Peirce zur Methodik wissenschaftlicher 
Forschungen angesehen. Siene Ansichten auf diesem 
Gebiet iibertreffen an Klarheit und fiberzeugungskraft 
die umfangreichen Arbeiten zur Metaphysik und Kosmologie. 
Er war Anhanger eines fallibilistischen Wissensbegriffs, 
der Welten entfernt ist von einem unbegrenzten Skep- 
tizismus. Seine Formulierungen der Bedingungen fiir 
sinnvollen Diskurs und der pragmatischen Maxime, 
obgleich nicht frei von Schwierigkeiten, haben sich 
als fruchtbare Ausgangspunkte fir sp;itere 
philosophische und wissenschaftliche Analysen erwiesen, 
und seine Klassifikation und Diskussion der 
Argumentationstypen und Schlui3folgerungen in wissen- 
schaftlichen Untersuchungen sind noch heute wertvolle 
und aufschlu@eiche Darlegungen dieses wichtigen 
Gegenstandes. Im Gegensatz zu seiner Darlegung der 
wissenschaftlichen Methode hat die von Peirce 
vertretene evolution;ire Theorie der letzten Realit&? 
wenig Bedeutung als Beitrag zu genuinem Wissen, obgleich 
sie sich durch Orginalitat und geistreiche Spekulationen 
auszeichnet. 
It has become a commonplace to say that Charles Peirce con- 
tinues to be the most original philosophical mind that the 
United States has yet produced, that he was more nearly like 
Leibniz than any other American philosopher with respect to the 
-we, variety, and ingenuity of his intellectual contributions, 
and that he was the founder of what is still this country's most 
distinctive philosophical movement. It is not my intent to 
challenge these characterizations of Peirce, with which I agree 
in large measure. My aim is to note and assess some of his 
contributions to philosophy in general, to the extent that these 
can be kept apart from the more narrowly technical ones he made 
to logic and mathematics. 
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But before turning to this task, I must mention briefly the 
range of his intellectual influence on other philosophical 
thinkers. Although the style of Peirce's writing and speaking 
made it difficult for readers and hearers alike to grasp his 
intent, many of his ideas made a profound impression on a number 
of his contemporaries, including William James, Josiah Royce, 
and John Dewey, despite the fact that they all differed signifi- 
cantly in their conceptions of philosophy and in their central 
philosophical concerns. However, the uses these men made of 
Peirce's ideas are well known, and I will therefore say no more 
about them. But it is often overlooked that a number of those 
ideas also affected the direction and content of the philosophic 
thought of younger and frequently less widely known men. No 
account of Peirce's place in philosophy can be regarded as 
reasonably adequate which fails to mention the strongly pragmatic 
component in C. I. Lewis' theory of knowledge and even in his 
views on formal logic; the uses Morris R. Coher made of Peirce's 
conception of the reality of universals in developing his own 
empirical rationalism, and especially his philosophies of 
science and of civilization; the instrumental interpolation of 
scientific theories that Frank Ramsey was stimulated to con- 
struct by his reading of Peirce; and finally, the functional 
analysis of language and parts of speech, an element in the 
linguistic turn in philosophy associated with the later 
Wittgensteinian teachings, a type of analysis Wittgenstein 
seemed to have learned from Peirce via Ramsey. If his importance 
is measured by no more than the extent to which his ideas influ- 
enced thought in the 20th century, Peirce surely merits a per- 
manent place in the history of philosophy. 
Peirce and the Logic of Scientific Inquiry 
In his famous paper, "The Fixation of Belief" [Peirce 1931, 
5.358 ff.], Peirce had argued that the method of scientific 
investigation is far superior to other methods he described for 
settling belief-upsetting doubts and gaining reliable knowledge. 
As it turned out, he devoted the major portion of his life to 
articulating what he believed to be the logic of scientific 
inquiry, although it was a project he never completed, and only 
portions of what he did manage to get on paper were published 
during his life. It should be noted, however, that he did not 
identify such a logic, as many recent writers do, with formal 
logic. On the contrary, according to Peirce, the logic of in- 
quiry must include an account of the conditions under which 
inquiries are initiated and eventually terminated; an analysis 
of the nature, variety, and uses of signs; a classification of 
the different types of reasoning employed in scientific inquiry; 
a formulation of the canons to which those forms of inference 
must conform if the inference is to be sound; and an examination 
and assessment of methodological principles that control the 
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conduct of inquiry. With respect to the overall content of 
logic, Peirce was closer to J. S. Mill than to many of Mill's 
dismissive critics. For, although Peirce rejected the latter's 
sensationalistic and nominalistic empiricism, and disagreed with 
many specific issues, he thought Mill was on the right course 
in taking logic to be "a connected view of the principles of 
evidence and the methods of scientific investigation" [Pierce 
1958, 8.1891. In any event, Peirce's analyses of issues con- 
cerning the logic of scientific inquiry (not counting his pioneer 
work in mathematical logic), are, in my opinion, his most im- 
portant contributions to philosophy. Moreover, although there 
undoubtedly are valuable and interesting nuggets of thought in 
his posthumous publications, I also think that the papers he 
published himself contain the substance of his views on the logic 
of scientific inquiry and are superior in clarity to the many 
articles that have become available only since his death. 
However this may be, Peirce maintained that inquiry, in- 
cluding scientific inquiry, begins in response to a doubt about 
an already established belief. Moreover, it was a central thesis 
in his account of the office of reasoning that the doubt which 
initiates an inquiry must be a genuine doubt; that is, it must 
be an uncertainty based on definite and specifically relevant 
reasons for entertaining it. Accordingly, an inquiry-generating 
doubt cannot, in this view, be a general skepticism concerning 
the very possibility of reliable knowledge--a skepticism some- 
times adopted when it is recognized that the available empirical 
evidence for a belief about matters of fact never has demonstra- 
tive force. To my mind, this Peircean thesis is of major im- 
portance, for among other things it undercuts the specious 
skepticism that has led a large school of philosophers of science 
(e-g., [Popper 1963, 271) to the self-defeating conclusion that 
we never have reliable knowledge, whether of individual happen- 
ings or of causal dependencies between events. 
On the other hand, Peirce also broke with the Cartesian 
tradition in epistemology and gave compelling reasons for re- 
jecting the claim that we can have immediate and completely cer- 
tain knowledge of any matter of fact. As he put it: "Direct 
experience is neither certain nor uncertain, because it affirms 
nothing" [Peirce 1931, 1.1451. Since knowledge as Peirce saw it 
is always the conclusion of an inference drawn from evidence that 
is unavoidably incomplete, he maintained that all claims to know- 
ledge are in principle corrigible even though in fact they may 
not need correction. He called this view of knowledge "falli- 
bilism;" and when it is conjoined with his account of the con- 
ditions that belief-unsettling doubts must satisfy, he referred 
to the conjunction of assertions as "contrite fallibilism." More 
over, he confessed that mout of a contrite fallibilism, combined 
with a high faith in the reality of knowledge, and an intense 
desire to find things out, all my philosophy has always seemed 
to me to growll [Peirce 1931, 1.141. 
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A major task of the logic of inquiry as Peirce understood 
it is to provide precepts for clarifying the concepts employed 
in scientific discourse. The only one he ever explicitly pro- 
posed is the so-called "pragmatic" maxim. However, the first 
formulation he gave of this maxim in his influential essay, 
"How to Make Our Ideas Clear," is notoriously vague. It is, 
nevertheless, the primary source of American pragmatism, and 
it has stimulated much fruitful discussion of the requirements 
meaningful discourse must satisfy, as well as detailed analyses 
and clarifications of important scientific concepts. It has 
also been interpreted at times to assert that the meaning of a 
statement consists in the sensory experiences an individual 
would have were he to verify the statement. In consequence, 
Peirce has been often regarded, in my opinion mistakenly, as 
simply an exponent of what came to be termed "the verifiability 
theory" of meaning as advocated during the early years of logi- 
cal positivism [Ayer 1959, 53-1291. In fact, however, he was 
a severe critic of atomistic sensationalism and of the notion 
that the meaning of a statement about the physical properties 
of a thing can be explicated by, and so reduced to, another 
statement which refers exclusively to some person's sensory 
experiences on a given occasion. As he repeatedly explained, 
he construed the pragmatic maxim as a proposal to understand 
abstract concepts in terms of their concrete applications, and 
therefore in terms of the habits of action their use involves. 
Although perceptual judgments are obviously required in making 
such applications, such judgments as well as habits of action 
contain a component of generality that is not exhausted by any 
finite set of momentary sense experiences. 
It must be admitted, however, that none of Peirce's formula- 
tions of the pragmatic maxim--not even those he proposed subse- 
quent to his initial one--satisfy the current standards of log- 
ical precision; no uniquely correct use of any version of the 
maxim can be made. But while a high degree of precision is 
often very desirable, I do not believe its absence from Peirce's 
statements of the maxim destroys the value of the general idea 
they express. For the idea in its various formulations has in- 
spired, and may continue to inspire, clarifications of important 
notions in various inquiries, such as the clarifications pro- 
posed by Bridgman in physics, Simpson in biology, or Kelsen in 
jurisprudence [Bridgman 1927; Kelsen 1945; Simpson 19641. 
Peirce was much impressed by the notion that language is 
the medium in which the rationality of the world is expressed 
and commuicated. He maintained in particular that "the woof 
and warp of all thought and all research is symbols, and the 
life of thought and science is the life inherent in symbols" 
[Peirce 1931, 2.2201. He therefore devoted much thought to 
analyzing the nature, variety, and function of signs, and he 
introduced a number of distinctions pertaining to them that 
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have been widely recognized as useful by linguists as well as 
by philosophers. He applies his analyses of the character of 
signs to reinforce his views on meaning, fallibilism, and the 
nature of mathematics, and he also uses them to support his 
realistic conception of universals. However, I have been unable 
to escape the conclusion that his reasoning about this concep- 
tion is circular, since the distinctions between signs he intro- 
duced and upon which he relies in his argument seem to me to 
presuppose the validity of the realistic assumption. Moreover, 
it is unclear to me in what way most of the novel distinctions 
he drew between signs (he recognized 66 independent classes of 
them) are relevant to the logic of scientific inquiry. Indeed, 
one has the impression that, like the Sorcerer's Apprentice in 
Goethe's poem, Peirce knew how to start a process--in his case, 
the drawing of distinctions--but found it difficult to stop. 
Peirce's major contribution to the more technical aspects 
of the logic of inquiry (at least so I think) is his classifi- 
cation of arguments employed in scientific research, his ac- 
count of the nature and source of their validity, and his general 
characterization of scientific method. He distinguished two 
major types of reasoning. One is explicative, in which the con- 
clusion is a necessary consequence of the premises, and may be 
general (that is, universal or existential), singular, or sta- 
tistical (i.e., probabilistic) in form. The other is ampliative, 
in which the conclusion does not strictly follow from the pre- 
mises, or as Peirce put it, "the facts summed up in the conclu- 
sion are not among those stated in premises," so that ampliative 
inferences are the only ones "which increase our real knowledge" 
[Peirce 1931, 2.6801. Because in ampliative or nondemonstrative 
inferences the conclusion could be false although the premises 
are true, some writers have denied that such inferences can 
properly be called Hreasoning," although the denial is bought 
at the price of ignoring indispensable procedures in scientific 
inquiry. Peirce, on the other hand, paid much attention to 
ampliative inferences and identified two important species of 
arguments belonging to that genus. One of them, called "induc- 
tion," has for its premises statements about the constitution 
of samples drawn from a class of items in a "random" manner 
and concludes with a statement about the constitution of the 
class itself. Peirce notes that thk conclusion of an inductive 
inference could be false, although the premise-statement about 
the constitution of a given sample is true. But he also points 
out that if the process of random sampling is continued, it can 
be shown that in the long run an approximately true conclusion 
about the composition of the class itself will be obtained. 
However, although the use of inductive reasoning can be "justi- 
fied" in the manner indicated Peirce correctly observed that 
the conclusions of such reasoiing cannot be said to be "probable" 
in some degree, if the term "probability" is construed, as 
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Peirce construes it, as a relative frequency (or the limit of 
relative frequencies) [Peirce 1931, 2.661-6681. This outcome 
is often taken to reveal a serious limitation in the frequency 
interpretation of "probability"; but this is not the occasion 
for discussiong the question whether there are viable altern- 
atives to that interpretation. 
Peirce gave various names to the second species of amplia- 
tive reasoning, among other labels, "abduction," which I shall 
use for convenient reference. The premises of an abductive 
agrument contain, in addition to other assumptions, the state- 
ment of some occurrence or regularity, while its conclusion, 
adopted tentatively, is a hypothesis which, were it true, would 
explain or account for that occurrence or regularity. The hy- 
pothesis is adopted only provisionally because its logical con- 
sequences are supposedly capable of verification, so that (as 
Peirce puts the matter) "the persevering application of the same 
method may be expected to reveal its disagreement with facts, 
if it does so disagree" [Peirce 1931, 1.681. He does not discuss 
what the basis is for that expectation, and he obviously does 
not believe that rules can be given for constructing fruitful 
hypotheses. But he does indicate some of the ways in which the 
weight of the evidence for a hypothesis may be increased. On 
the other hand, he maintains, as in the case of the conclusions 
of inductive inference, that the explanatory hypotheses which 
are the conclusions of abduction cannot be assigned some degree 
of probability--for on the frequency interpretation of proba- 
bility this could be done only if universes were as plentiful 
as blackberries. But this raises an issue that is as unsettled 
today as it was when Peirce wrote about the subject. 
A distinctive feature of Peirce's account of the logical 
methods of science is his denial that they have any metaphysical 
presuppositions, or that any completely nonempirical consider- 
ations are 'required to establish their validity and effective- 
ness. He maintained that the logical canons and methods of 
scientific inquiry have themselves been obtained in the course 
of inquiry, and that they are "self-corrective"--both in the 
sense that hypotheses about statistical and other properties of 
populations can be improved by continued use of those logical 
methods, as well as in the sense that limitations and defects 
in those methods can be discovered in the very process of using 
them, and can be remedied by supplementing established methods 
with new ones suggested by problems encountered in inquiry. 
Peirce's articulation of such a self-corrective logic of scien- 
tific inquiry, although incomplete in a number of ways and no 
longer at the cutting edge o'f research into the subject, has 
won for him an honored place in the annals of the development 
of philosophical analysis. 
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Peirce's Methaphysics and Cosmology 
I want finally to comment briefly on several components of 
Peirce's philosophy that are at best only remotely related to 
the logic of inquiry. I think it best to confess at once that 
I have found his speculative metaphysics and idealistic cosmol- 
ogy neither well argued nor congenial. 
Peirce devoted much thought to the construction of an arch- 
itectonically based list of ultimate categories, so complete 
that all intellectual achievements of men as well as the contents 
of the nonhuman world can be subsumed under one or the other of 
them. But he never made clear just what status he assigned to 
them. Despite his rejection of immediate knowledge, he fre- 
quently described the categories as directly apprehended logical 
simples into which the complexity of whatever is experienced may 
be analyzed. Moreover, his account of the categories is gen- 
erally presented in a highly anthropomorphic language, so that 
features distinctive of the human scene are then read without 
hesitation into all parts of nature--for example, a "fact" 
according to him "fights its way into existence" [Peirce 1931, 
1.4321. In sum, I have been unable to discover what Peirce's 
categories clarify. 
According to Peirce, every sound metaphysics must be evolu- 
tionary. This dictum is based largely on the further assumption 
that what needs to be explained is not the variety, freshness, 
and spontaneity of things, but the uniformities they exhibit. 
Accordingly, uniformities must be "explained" by showing how, 
out of a primal chaos in which everything occurs by "chance," 
together with a "tendency" in the flux of things to take on 
habits, laws or regularities have evolved. The three active 
elements in the universe are said to be chance, law, and the 
tendency for things to take on habits. 
I do not believe Peirce has given a coherent and plausible 
account of the general nature of things. In what way is a law 
or regularity active? What is the ground for the dictum that 
uniformities, and never their absence, require explanation? 
Is not a tendency to form habits a type of regularity? It may 
be possible to explain a specified law by showing it to be a 
consequence of some more inclusive set of laws or regularities. 
But does it make sense to suppose that regularity or order could 
be explained without assuming some other regularity or order? 
Does it illuminate anything to assimilate laws to habits, as 
Peirce does? What real evidence is there for his assumption 
that natural laws are like habits, which human beings adopt or 
sometimes drop? And what has happened to the pragmatic maxim, 
when he claims mind (or chance) to be the primary and ultimate 
reality in the universe? 
I hope I have said enough to justify my belief that Peirce's 
metaphysics and cosmology violate the logical cannons of respon- 
310 Ernest Nagel HM 9 
sibly conducted inquiry, and that although his idealistic phil- 
osophy may exhibit remarkable originality and ingenuity, it has 
no standing as a significant contribution to genuine knowledge 
or to the arts for achieving it. 
Let me say, finally, that these reflections are not intended 
to cast doubt on the eminence of Charles Peirce as a philosoph- 
ical thinker. They are meant to suggest that his thought was 
not of one piece and of uniform quality, and as cautionary words 
directed against the idolization of his ideas. 
NOTE 
It is a great privilege to participate in the symposium 
honoring Carolyn Eisele on the occasion of the publication of 
the five volumes of Charles Peirce's The New Elements of Math- 
ematics, which she edited--a task to which she gave many years 
of demanding and devoted labor. All of us who have been stu- 
dents of Peirce are heavily indebted to her for her boundless 
enthusiasm in calling attention to the importance of Peirce's 
thought and in making available much of his previously unpub- 
lished writings; and I cannot refrain from expressing my per- 
sonal thanks for her many contributions to Peirce scholarship. 
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